| 摘 要: 为破解不完全信息下电商平台信用监管困境，利用动态演化博弈模型，探究电商平台信用监管策略。首先构建静态和动态奖惩机制下电商平台和商家的演化博弈模型，系统地考察影响监管博弈中双方策略的因素；然后通过数值计算确定各情形下的博弈均衡点；最后仿真分析奖惩机制对各主体行为策略的影响。仿真分析验证了博弈模型的准确性。结果表明：与静态奖惩相比，商家对于电商平台动态奖惩的敏感性更高，科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于激励电商平台和商家健康稳定发展。 |
| 关键词: 信用监管；动态奖惩；演化博弈 |
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中图分类号: TP399
文献标识码: A
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| 基金项目: 教育部人文社科项目青年项目(20YJC630008). |
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| Research on Credit Supervision Strategy of E-Commerce Platform based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game |
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LIU Mengru, CHEN Ruiyi
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(School of Management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China)
mr12345699@163.com; rychen@aliyun.com
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| Abstract: To crack the credit regulation dilemma of e-commerce platform under incomplete information, this paper proposes to explore the credit supervision strategy of e-commerce platform with the dynamic evolutionary game model. Firstly, the evolutionary game model of e-commerce platform and merchants under static and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is constructed, and the factors influencing the strategies of both parties in the regulatory game are systematically investigated. Then, the equilibrium points of the game under each situation are numerically calculated. Finally, the impact of the reward and punishment mechanism on the behavior strategies of each subject is analyzed by simulation. The simulation analysis verifies the accuracy of the game model. The results show that compared with static rewards and penalty, businesses are more sensitive to the dynamic rewards and penalty of e-commerce platform, and the scientific and reasonable dynamic rewards and penalty mechanism can help stimulate the healthy and stable development of e-commerce platform and businesses. |
| Keywords: credit supervision; dynamic rewards and penalty; evolutionary game |
